Volume 71
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 71,
1966-1967
10-1-1966

The Duty to Rescue the Good Samaritan
Robert A. Carlson

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Robert A. Carlson, The Duty to Rescue the Good Samaritan, 71 DICK. L. REV. 75 (1966).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol71/iss1/3

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

COMMENTS

I

THE DUTY TO RESCUE THE GOOD SAMARITAN
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and
fell among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and
wounded him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And
by chance there came down a certain priest, that way: and
when he saw him, he passed by on the other side.
And likewise a Levite, when he was at the place, came and
looked on him, and passed by on the other side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and
when he saw him, he had compassion on him. And went to
him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and
set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and
took care of him.
Luke 10:30-34
Public apathy, indifference, and aloofness are the by-products
of our modern, high-speed, mechanical nation. The good Samaritan
is being covered with the industrial soot and noxious exhaust of
"The Great Society" while his morality is being legally enforced
elsewhere.' The disparity offers a timely and valuable comparison.
THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE COMMON LAW
The moral obligation exemplified by the parable of the good
Samaritan is that a man is required to go to the aid or rescue of any
person who, by his own conduct or the misconduct of others, is
placed in a dangerous position from which he cannot extricate
himself without assistance. 2 The common law has consistently resisted the transformation of this moral obligation into a legal
duty.3
1. In 1886, the DurcH CRIMINAL CODE art. 450 Tripels, Les Codes
Neerlandais 726 (1886), provided a fine of 300 florins and imprisonment
up to three months for a person who refused aid to another "in danger of
death without danger to himself or another" and death resulted. Similar
provisions are found in the BELGIAN PENAL CODE art. 422 bis and art. 422
ter; CIVIL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 149, 150; CZECHOSLOVAK CRIM-

INAL CODE para. 227, 228, CIVIL CODE §§ 415, 416, 418, 419, 425; DANISH CRIMINAL CODE art 253; FRENCH PENAL CODE art. 63; HUNGARIAN CRIMINAL CODE
§ 259; ITALIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 593; NORWEGIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 387;
POLISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 247; PORTUGUESE CRIMINAL CODE art. 2368; RuMANIAN CRIMINAL CODE art. 489; RUSSIAN PENAL CODE § 127; SWITZERLAND,
ST. GALLEN PENAL STATUTES art. 67, OBWALDEN PENAL POLICE STAT. art. 136,
137, TICINo STATUTE OF 1873; TURKISH CRIMINAL CODE art. 476.

2. 38 AM. JUR. NEGLIGENCE § 17 (1941).
3. 2 HARPER AND JAMES, ToRTs § 18.6 at 1046 (1956), N.Y. Times, April
10, 1965, p. 31, col. 1. Gregory, Legal Risks in Samaritanism, The Philadelphia Inquirer, April 25, 1965, § 7, p. 2.
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The Levite and the priest have no duty to aid or assist a stranger, nor are they punished for their abstention under the common
law. 4 It is argued that this nonrecognition of a legal duty to aid or
rescue a stranger stems from the philosophy that an individual is
perfectly capable of caring for himself and any legal imposition
upon him to aid or assist another is a proscription of his personal
freedom. 5 This rationalization cannot prevail when confronted
with the harsh facts of a modern, interdependent society and its
accompanying crime. Such a society demands positive not negative law.6
The import of Anglo-American rescue law is negative. The
unselfish humanitarian is discouraged from assisting a stranger
while the priest and the Levite are encouraged to remain indifferent to his plight. If the Samaritan takes affirmative steps to assist
another, he is deemed to have entered into a relationship with
him. He thereafter becomes liable for his negligent acts and omissions.7 In Zelenko v. Gimbel Bros.8 a woman shopper fainted to the
floor of a department store. The defendant removed her to the
ladies' room where she remained some six hours. In holding the
defendant liable in damages for his benevolent misfeasance, the
court said that:
[I]f a defendant undertakes a task, even if under no duty
to undertake it, the defendant must not omit to do what an
ordinary man would do in performing the task. This defendant assumed its duty by meddling in matters with
which legalistically it had no concern.9
The court in effect said that callous disregard for the misfortunes
of strangers immunizes the bystander from liability.
4. See e.g., Chadwich v. Air Reduction Co., 239 F. Supp. 247 (N.D.
Ohio 1965); Osterland v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301 (1928); People v.
Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 314
(1934). See also Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 69 N.H. 257, 44 Ati. 809 (1897),
wherein a factory owner was not held liable for injury to a child tresspasser. The court said:
The defendants are not liable unless they owed to the plaintiff
a legal duty which they neglected to perform. With purely moral
obligations the law does not deal. For example, the priest and
Levite who passed by on the other side were not, it is supposed,
liable at law for the continued suffering of the man who fell among
the thieves, which they might and morally ought to have prevented.
Id. at 259, 44 AtI. 810.
5. Note, The Failure To Rescue: A Comparative Study, 52 COLUM.
L. REv. 631, 632 (1952).
6. Goldberg, Misprisionof Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context,
52 A.B.A.J. 148 (1966); Time, March 4, 1966, p. 62.
7. PROSSER, ToRs 334, 335 (3d ed. 1964); Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631,
632 (1952), Annot., 64 A.L.R. 2d 1179 (1959).
8. 158 Misc. 904, 287 N.Y.S. 134 (1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 867, 287
N.Y.S. 136 (1936).
9. Id. at 905, 287 N.Y.S. at 135.
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The Zelenko court laid down a rule of law which contradicts
basic moral teachings and convictions. It is an onerous and insensitive rule of law which permits and encourages the priest and the
Levite to continue on their way with impunity while the Samaritan
must submit himself to the rigors and expenses of a trial on the
merits of his benevolence. The result is a legal mandate to be indifferent to the sufferings of strangers. 10
The absurdity of the common law rule that a legal duty to
aid another does not arise out of a mere moral duty is demonstrated in People v. Beardsley." Defendant, a married man, was
found not guilty of manslaughter resulting from an orgiastic weekend with a woman not his wife. The defendant and the deceased
woman had been drinking heavily at the defendant's rooms for
several days during the absence of his wife. After being told that
she would have to leave because of the wife's return, deceased swallowed a number of morphine tablets with suicidal intent. Defendant knew that she had taken the tablets yet he did not procure
proper medical attention for her. Instead the intoxicated defendant
had a third person place the deceased, now in a stupor, in the care
of a boarder living in the basement of the house. The tenant was
instructed to let her out the back door when she revived. She
never woke up.
The prosecution argued that the acquitted had "stood towards
this woman for the time being in the place of her natural guardian and protector, and as such owed her a clear legal duty which
he completely failed to perform."' 2 In rejecting the prosecutor's
contentions the court in part said:
The cases cited and digested establish that no such
legal duty is created based upon a mere moral obligation.
The fact that this woman was in his house created no such
legal duty as exists in law and is due from a husband
towards his wife ....

Such an inference would be very

repugnant to our moral sense. Respondent had assumed
either in fact or by implication no care or control over his
companion ....

[W] e do not find that such a legal duty

as is contended for existed in fact or by implication.., the
omission of which involved criminal liability.13
It is repugnant to our moral sense that a mere legal relation10. Michael and Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide, 37
COLUM. L. REV. 701, 751, n. 175 (1937): "It is clear that an omission may be
viewed psychologically in precisely the same way as an act and that the
consequences of an omission are susceptible of the same analytical treatment as those of an act."
11. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 (1907).
12. Id. at 209, 113 N.W. at 1131.
13. Ibid.
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ship is determinative of guilt, 4 rather than the nature of the omission. 5 Replace the deceased with the wife of the acquitted in the
same fact situation and, according to the Beardsley court, the defendant would be guilty of manslaughter.
A better doctrine, cited and rejected by the court in Beardsley,",
is stated by an English court:
It would not be correct to say that every moral obligation involves a legal duty; but every legal duty is founded
upon a moral obligation. A legal common law duty is nothing else than the enforcing by law of that which is a moral
obligation without enforcement. 17
This rule of law avoids the blatant inconsistency of application to
which the Beardsley decision leads.
The court in Beardsley correctly points out that unless there
is a pre-existing relationship between the parties creating a duty,
there is absolutely no duty to render aid. Once the court finds the
relationship to exist, however, the failure to rescue becomes culpable conduct.' 8 The carrier-passenger relationship is one such example of the exception to the common20law of no duty to rescue; 19
the parent-child relationship is another.
The duty to rescue or render assistance in these situations
flows from the nature of the relationship. The relationship raises
the universal moral obligation to the dignity of a legally enforceable duty and an exception to the general common law rule of
absolutely no legal duty to aid or rescue a stranger.
14. See Commonwealth v. Breth, 44 Pa. Co. 56 (1915); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4727 (1963).
15. Michael and Wechsler, supra note 10, at 751, n. 175:
[T]he common law, like most legal systems, restricts criminal
liability for omissions, regardless of the degree of obvious peril that
action would avert, to cases where there is a legal duty to act speIt is worth observing,
cially created, as by statute or contract ....
however, that an appeal to common decency is in essence no less
specific than the standard of liability for negligent acts. Whereas
the issue there is . . . whether or not the act is a sufficiently necessary means to sufficiently desirable ends to compensate for the
risk of death or injury which it creates, the issue here is whether
or not freedom to remain inactive serves ends that are sufficiently
desirable to compensate for the evil that inaction permits to befall.
...Nor is the deterrence of inaction a different problem from that
of deterring acts, though it may sometimes be more difficult to
prove the state of mind accompanying an omission than that accompanying an act.
16. People v. Beardsley, 150 Mich. at 209, 113 N.W. at 1131.
17. Regina v. Instan, 17 Cox Crim. Cas. 602 (1893).
18. Harris v. Pennsylvania R.R., 50 F.2d 866 (4th Cir. 1931); L. S.
Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 220 Ind. 86, 41 N.E.2d 356 (1942). See Note, 17 CoRN.
L. Q. 505 (1932); Comment, 8 Mo. L. REv. 205 (1943).
19. Kambour v. Boston & Me. R.R., 77 N.H. 33, 86 Atl. 624 (1913).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4727 (1963) See PRossR, op. cit. supra
note 7, at 337-38.
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The duty is breached when one party creates or permits the
development of a dangerous situation for the other party. The
moment the "rescuee" becomes endangered as a result of this
breach, the "rescuer" is legally obligated to render all the assistance feasible in order to mitigate injury. Failure to perform or21
negligent performance of this duty makes him liable in damages.
Other assaults against the common law of no duty to rescue
22
are found in most states in their respective motor vehicle codes.
Under the provision of most codes, failure to rescue and render
assistance results in criminal prosecution. 23 The Pennsylvania
Motor Vehicle Code provides inter alia:
The driver and owner, if present, of any vehicle involved in
any accident. . . shall render to any person injured in such
accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying of
such person to a physician or surgeon for medical treatis necessary, or
ment, if it is apparent that such treatment
24
is requested by the injured person.
It is submitted, however, that an accident, especially one involving injury, creates a relationship between the parties not dissimilar to the parent-child and carrier-passenger situations. Once
the "accidental relationship" arises, the duty is imposed, but not
before nor independent of the accident.
The development of the special rules imposing the duty to
rescue when special relationships exist between the parties, the
discussions by legal writers, 25 and at least the recognition by the
26
are all
courts of the moral obligation where there is no fault,

indicative of possible progress towards freeing the good Samaritan from his common law shackles. However, the common law does
RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 322 (1934); SUM. PA. JuR. TORTS, § 9 (1958).
22. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95%, § 135 (1959); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
75, § 1027(b) (1960). See also N.Y. PEN. LAW § 483; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §
4727 (1963) (duty to rescue an injured child).
23. Commonwealth v. Adams, 146 Pa. Super. 601, 23 A.2d 59 (1942)
(holding that the statute is penal and must be strictly construed). Prosecution follows only where it has been shown that the vehicle driver or
owner had knowledge that he had injured a person or damaged property

21.

of another. See Commonwealth v. Hyman, 117 Pa. Super. 585, 178 Atl.
510 (1935).
(Emphasis added).
24. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 1027(b) (1960).
Under § 1027(c) the occupants of the vehicle involved in an accident are
similarly required to assist if the driver is physically unable. As affecting
civil liability see Annot., 80 A.L.R. 2d 299 (1961).
25. LIVINGSTON, COMPLETE WORKS IN CRIMINAL JURISPRUDENCE, 126-27
(1873); POUND, LAW

AND MORALS

68 (2d ed. 1926);

2

HARPER

&

JAMES,

op.

cit. supra note 3; Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908); Bohlen,
The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA. L. REV.
217 (1908).

26. Brooks v. E. J. Willig Truck Transp. Co., 40 Cal.2d 669, 255 P.2d
802 (1953).
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not appear to be completely prepared to depart from its callousness towards the endangered and attach legal consequences to
civil indifference and inaction.27 The following examples of a practicable duty to rescue law and subsequent suggestions are offered
to assist in the preparation.

THE

GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE CivIL LAW

In direct contradistinction to the reluctance of the common law
to recognize nonfeasance as a foundation stone of liability, many
nations have deemed it necessary to legislate against the bad Samaritan who abstains from helping an imperiled stranger when
there is little inconvenience and danger to himself. 28 The Dutch incorporated such a provision in their Criminal Code as early as 1886.
Article 63 of the French Code P6nal is representative of this type
of legislation which imposes criminal liability upon those who refuse to rescue persons exposed to serious danger.
Article 63 states:
1) Any person who, by his immediate action and without danger to himself or others, could have prevented either
a felonious act or a misdemeanor against the person, willfully fails to do so, shall be punished by jailing for no less
than three months nor more than five years and by fine
from 36,000 to 1,500,000 francs, or either punishment, unless more severe punishments are provided by this Code or
special law.
2) Any person who willfully fails to render or to obtain assistance to an endangered person when such was
possible without danger 29to himself or others, shall be subject to like punishments.
27. 2 HARPER & JAMES, op. cit. supra note 3, 1046. See also PROSSER,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 337-38.
28. See statutes cited note 1 supra.
29. French Code Pnal art. 63 in its entirety reads as follows:
1) Any person who, by his immediate action and without danger to himself or others, could have prevented either a felonious
act or a misdemeanor against the person, willfully fails to do so,
shall be punished by jailing for no less than three months nor more
than five years and by fine from 36,000 to 1,500,000 francs, or either
punishment, unless more severe punishments are provided by this
Code or special law. [Approximately $70 to $3,000.]
2) Any person who willfully fails to render or to obtain assistance to an endangered person when such was possible without danger to himself or others, shall be subject to like punishments.
3) Any person who willfully fails to immediately furnish judicial or law enforcement authorities with evidence in his possession
of the innocence of a person detained pending or after trial for a
felony or misdemeanor, although he had been in a position to do
so, shall be subject to like punishments. However, no punishment
shall be imposed upon anyone submitting his testimony late but
voluntarily.
4) These provisions are not applicable to the perpetrators, coprincipals, accessories and relatives by blood or marriage, up to the
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The punishable crime under Article 63 is one of "direct"30 omission to fulfill the legal duty to rescue when all of the conditions as
delineated in the article are present. An analysis of these conditions is a prerequisite to understanding the application of the
article by the courts.
Before the duty to rescue can arise under Article 63, there
must be a living person 31 in a perilous situation. There must be a
constant and present danger which is serious enough to threaten
the well-being of the person confronted with it or exposed to it.
The cause or creator of the danger is immaterial.3 2 It is only required that it be an imminent and constant danger demanding
immediate intervention on the part of the rescuer to diminish or
3

prevent itY

The French courts have held that the duty to rescue is greater
for one who has by his own act created the danger.3 4 Emile Gargon
points out in Code Pgnal Annotg, that a difficult problem arises
where the act creating the danger was in and of itself a crime.
Since the author of a crime is not required to voluntarily submit
himself to the authorities, he argues that compliance with the duty
to rescue would expose him to the risk of being arrested.3s Article
63 states that the duty to rescue ceases when intervention would
create a risk to the rescuer or a third person. The wording of the
article suggests, however, that the risk be one of physical injury or
death. The courts are in accord with this interpretation.36 Therefore, the risks of identification and arrest suggested by Gargon are
not regarded as legitimate and will not be considered by the
37

courts.

fourth degree inclusive.
Paragraph 1 is known as misprision of felony under the common law and
is a federal crime in the United States, see 18 U.S.C. § 4 (1964). See Neal v.
United States, 102 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Trigilio, 255
F.2d 385 (2d Cir. 1958). See State v. Flynn, 217 A.2d 432 (R.I. 1966), which
holds that misprision of felony is an indictable offense in Rhode Island.
See Glazebrook, How Long, Then, Is The Arm Of The Law To Be?, 25 MOD.
L. REV. 301 (1962), wherein the author questions whether misprision of
felony is actually a common law offense in England.
30. Comment, 11 AM. J. COMP. L. 66, 70 (1962).
31. Judgment of the Tribunal Correctionnel de Poitiers, April 27, 1950
(1950) Juris-Classeur p6riodique (hereinafter cited as J.C.P.) II. 5618 (Fr.).
32. GARQON, CODE PtNAL ANNOTL 201 (new ed. 1952).
33.

Ibid. See also 1

BOUZAT ET PINATEL, TRAMT

DE DROIT PANAL ET DE

126 (1962).
34. GARqON, supra note 32 at 203.
35. Ibid.
36. Tribunal Correctionnel de B6thune, October 19, 1950 (1951) J.C.P.
II. 5990.
37. Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), March 23, 1953, Bulletin des arr6ts
de la Cour de Cassation, (hereinafter cited as Bull. Crim.) Chambre criminelle No. 104, p. 53 (Fr.).
CRIMINOLOCTE
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Another condition to consider under Article 63 is the risk to the
rescuer or to a third party. If it is of such magnitude as to warrant
personal abstention, there remains a duty to obtain assistance for
The choice between personal rescue and
an endangered person.3
obtaining outside assistance for the endangered person depends
upon the circumstances of each particular situation, and the propriety of the rescuer's decision is subject to the scrutiny of the
court.3 9

The courts have dealt harshly with those who make an unreasonable decision to procure assistance in lieu of rendering immediate aid. 40 It might appear that the necessity to properly decide
the nature of the rescue to be employed is an unjustly added
burden for the rescuer in an already tense atmosphere. In reality,
however, the circumstances surrounding the situation dictate the
possibility and necessity of immediate intervention or a call for
assistance, and the French courts have used their interpretive discretion fairly, yet firmly, in applying the standard of reasonableness to the situation. 41 The law as interpreted, does not require
and
heroic deeds on the part of the rescuer, but rather realistic
42
reasonable humanitarian action under the circumstances.
The French Supreme Court ruled in 1961 that even when rescue efforts appear futile, the obligation to render active assistance
is not abrogated nor conditioned by the degree of conjectured inefficacy. The court held that the father of a sick child had adequately described the mortal symptoms to warrant the personal
visit of the physician. The prescription given to the father did not
fulfill the duty of the doctor to go see the victim. 43

The loop-

hole excuse that personal assistance would not have been helpful
44
does not satisfy the statute.
38. French Penal Code art. 63, Text given in (1947) Dalloz Jurisprudence (hereinafter cited as D.) 130 (16g.) (Fr.). See Code P6nal, 61
6d. Petits Codes Dalloz, Paris 1962, pp. 40-41 and 62 6d. 1965, pp. 36-38.
39. Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.) July 26, 1954 (1954) D. 666.
40. Tribunal Correctionnel d'Aix, March 27, 1947 (1947) D. 304, (1947)
J.C.P. II. 3583. Tribunal Correctionnel de Bayeux, June 22, 1954, (1954) D.
603. See also Dawson, Negotiorum Gestio. The Altruistic Intermeddler,
(pts 1-2) 74 HARv. L. REv. 817, 1106, wherein the author notes that the
German courts are similarly harsh toward cowardly assistance.
41. Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), October 9, 1956 (1956) J.C.P. II.
9598 (1956) Gazette du Palais II. 209 (Fr.). See also the examples in
BOUZAT ET PINATEL, Op. cit. supra note 33, at 126 § II(a).
42. Dawson, op. cit. supra note 40, at 1107; GARtON, op. cit. supra note
34 at 202, wherein the author points out that leaving an injured man all
alone in the woods to go in search of aid, when immediate aid was needed,
would be an unreasonable choice.
43. Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), March 15, 1961 (1961) D. 610.
44. Prior decisions had held to the contrary. Cour de Cassation (Ch.
crim.), July 26, 1954, (1956) J.C.P. II. 9598.
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A final condition to be fulfilled under Article 63 is that the abstention be voluntary. 45 The law only punishes those persons who
are aware of the immediate or impending danger to another and
who are in a position to help, yet affirmatively choose not to render
aid. It is not significant if the intention to refuse assistance stems
from apathetic or malicious motives. 4 It is sufficient that the abstention is willful on the part of the putative rescuer while he was
47
aware of the impending danger and the necessity of intervention.
In the case where the person in a position to assist the imperiled or injured victim is on the scene, the urgency of assistance
is easily ascertained. Refusal to assist in such a situation is not
difficult to determine. The problem becomes more complicated
where, because of great risk or inability to effectively cope with the
situation, the rescuer summons the assistance of another person
who is distant from the scene and unaware of the tragedy. After
being apprised of the danger, distance from the calamity does not
remove the obligation to render aid under Article 63.48 The obligation in effect passes from the informer to the informed.49 Thus,
the party who summons the assistance of another exculpates himself while subjecting the party summoned to the obligations and
sanctions of the law. It must be noted however, that if the first
rescuer was capable of rescue in the first instance without great
risk to himself, the obligation does not so pass.50 When the obligation does pass to the informed party, all of the conditions set
forth in Article 63 pertain. The punishments also apply in the
case of inaction or outright refusal to go to the scene. 51
The delicate question to be passed upon by the courts in this
type of situation is whether or not the person summoned to help
is sufficiently apprised of the direness of the peril. Since the
same requirements of Article 63 apply to the party summoned, the
gravity of the peril and the necessity of his particular assistance
must be adequately impressed upon him by the summoner. If the
summoner fails to explain the situation adequately, the summoned
45. French Code Penal art. 63 paragraph 2.
46. Tribunal Correctionnel de Charleville, February 6, 1952, (1952) D.
481, (1952) J.C.P. II. 6987. BouzAT ET PINATEL, op. cit. supra note 33 at 129;
GARgON, supra note 32 at 203.

47.

Ibid. See also Note, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 631, 643 (1952), wherein

the author points out that this might encourage ignorance of dangerous
situations in order to avoid prosecution.

48. Colin et autres, Cour d'Appel de Nancy, October 27, 1965 (1966)
D. 2eme Cahier 30 (Fr.) (hereinafter cited as Colin et autres).
49.

50.
51.
n. 99.

Ibid.
BOUZAT ET PINATEL, op. cit. supra note 33 at 126, 11 (a).
Colin et autres, supra note 48, GARVON, op. cit. supra note 32 at 202
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is required to ascertain the facts and extent of injury subject to
the realistic and reasonable test of the courts. 5 2

This occurs fre-

quently when a doctor is prevailed upon to render his professional
services to a seriously injured person situated at a distance from
his office.53 The French courts have used discretion in such cases,
and in a very important decision in 1949 held that "it is entirely up
to the doctor called to decide and evaluate, under the control of his
own conscience and the rules governing his profession, the utility
and the urgency of his intervention. 54 More recently, the range
of considerations entertained by the courts has been expanded to
include all of the circumstances surrounding the situation in
which the doctor is prevailed upon to assist. 55
The case of Colin et autres,5" decided by the Court of Appeals
of Nancy, involves all of the above questions and poignantly demonstrates the necessity of a law such as Article 63. In the Colin case,
a young man was stabbed during an altercation following a dance
in Frouard. Mariotte, a bystander, saw Fleury bleeding and ran to
the home of his family doctor about one thousand feet away.5" He
awakened Dr. Colin at about 3:55 a.m. and explained to him that
a man was lying in a pool of blood in a nearby street. According
to the testimony of Mariotte, the irritated doctor said that he was
in his pajamas and could not go out in the cold dressed as such, and
that Mariotte should call an ambulance to bring the wounded man
58
to his office or to take him to the hospital in Nancy.
The doctor claimed
and that Mariotte told
ambulance was on the
Dr. 59
Colin returned to
a.m.

that he was awakened towards 4:10 a.m.,
him the police had been alerted and an
way. After waiting up for a half hour,
bed. Fleury died at approximately 4:20

The TTibunal CoTrectionel de Nancy, the criminal court of first

instance, found the six members of the group who had run from
52. Colin et autres, supra note 48 at 31.
53. Ibid. The problems of the medical doctor and Article 63 are
thoroughly discussed by Vouim, Le Mddecin devant 1'article 63 du Code
Penal, 12 REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINELLE ET DE DROIT PPNAL COMPARL 352
(1957) (Fr.).
54. Cour de Cassation (Ch. crim.), May 31, 1949 (1949) D. 347, (1949)
J.C.P. II. 4945.
55. Tribunal Correctionnel de Colmar, May 12, 1960 (1960) Gazette
du Palais II. 112 (Fr.). (Emphasis added).
56. Colin et autres, Cour d'Appel de Nancy, October 27, 1965 (1966)
D. 2eme Cahier 30 (Fr). The Cour d'Appel is the first court of appeal in
France.
57. (Emphasis added).
58. Colin et autres, supra note 56, at 31.
59. Ibid.
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the scene 0 and Dr. Colin guilty of violating paragraph 2 of Article
63 in failing to render aid to the bleeding victim."1 The members
of the group who had fled from the scene were given suspended
sentences ranging from eight to fifteen days and fined thirty
dollars each. Dr. Colin received a four months sentence and a
62
fine of approximately two hundred dollars.
The defendants appealed and four months later the Court of
Appeals of Nancy rendered a substantially different verdict. Two
of the young spectators to the murder were acquitted because
they were not cognizant of the perilous condition of Fleury when
they fled the scene and therefore they were not required to assist 6 3 The testimony of the other four members of the group revealed that they did know Fleury was bleeding profusely, and
therefore they were given the minimum penalty of three months
in prison and fined thirty dollars. Dr. Colin was also sentenced to
three months in prison, however his fine was increased to one
thousand dollars.6 4 The court, supporting its condemnation of the
four who drove from the scene of the tragedy with the murderer,
supplied the following reasons for the decision:
Knowing Fleury was injured, the group
1) abandoned the victim lying in the street;
2) without calling the police, or a doctor;
3) without rendering the least bit of assistance;
4) the flight from the scene of the crime was effected
in a frenzy of panic because they knew Fleury had been
seriously injured;
5) F6vre, who stabbed Fleury, had told them he didn't
want to call the police because he would get at least a year
in prison for what he had done; and
6) as a result of this information, in addition to what
they had seen and heard, the foursome should have
65 called
a doctor or returned to the scene and helped Fleury.
Since all of the conditions of Article 63, paragraph 2, were satisfied, the court concluded that the four were justly condemned
and liable for the minimum punishment provided by the law.
The court held that Dr. Colin had been grossly remiss in his
nonfeasance. The court reasoned that notwithstanding the fact
that Dr. Colin had been inadequately informed of the situation by
60. F~vre, the murderer, was tried separately for that crime.
61. Colin et autres, supra note 56, at 30.
62. (Approximately 1,000 francs). The amounts of the fines are approximated to the current rate of exchange.
63. Colin et autres, supra note 56, at 31.
64. Ibid. (Approximately 5,000 francs).
65. Translated by the author from Colin et autres, supra note 56, at
30-31.
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Mariotte, he should have recognized the emotional state of his informer 6 and solicited more information from him concerning the
victim in order to determine the urgency and necessity of his intervention. The court further held that Dr. Colin had a duty to inform himself as to the condition of Fleury before deciding his
proper course of action. By refusing to render medical assistance,
with absolutely no risk of physical harm, he was guilty of violating his duty to rescue under Article 63.67
The decision is interesting in view of the fact that the court
took it upon itself to explain that the reasons for Article 63 stem
from the indifference and egoism of the public.6 8 The public refuses
to recognize its humanitarian duty to help an injured or endangered
stranger, but prefers to "pass by on the other side of the road."
The purpose of Article 63, according to the court, is to punish those
persons who choose to ignore their moral obligations toward others.6 9 Condemnation under the law results only from a failure to
act but does not stem from the physiological condition of the victim. The ineffective rescuer is not criminally liable for the death
or injury of the victim if he is not the cause thereof. By failing to
rescue, however, the defendant may incur both criminal and civil
liability.
In Colin, the parents of Fleury sued the defendants, in their
own right, as parties civiles to the action. This practice is permitted in the French courts. 70 The court found the defendants
jointly liable for six hundred dollars, payable to the parents of
the deceased, for the moral and material wrong occasioned them
by the defendants' failure to aid their son. The defendants contended that the law is public in tenor and an infraction thereof
is not against an individual but against the public. The court, however, held that the law was directed against the apathetic public
in order to protect particular individuals from public indifference
and therefore the victims of criminal abstention have a right to sue
71
civilly for any injury resulting therefrom.
In a note to the case, Jean Lorentz72- indicated that the Colin
court was relying on a decision of the Cour de Cassation, the
French Supreme Court, wherein the court said that the cause of
the tort need not be direct or immediate to be actionable, but
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
Nancy.

Dr. Colin was Mariotte's family physician.
Colin et autres, supra note 56, at 31.
Ibid.
Ibid.
SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 239, n. 13, (2d ed. 1959).
Colin et autres, supra note 56, at 31.
Jean Lorentz is the auditor of justice to the Cour d'Appel de
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might be simply a link in the chain of events. 7 3 The omissions of

the defendants formed such causal links resulting in the death
of Fleury.
Civil liability was also imposed in a case where a defendant
walked away from his son-in-law who had fallen through a hole
in the ice of a canal. He had refused to assist a third person in
extending a nearby metal bar to the drowning man. The trial court
reprimanded his not-so-gallant conduct with three years in prison.
Surviving the ordeal, the son-in-law succeeded in obtaining a four
hundred and fifty dollar judgment in his civil action against the
father-in-law. 4
These decisions amply demonstrate how the standard of conduct imposed by the criminal law has been carried over to the civil
law, allowing the recovery of damages in tort from one who has
committed the crime of failing to rescue.75 It should be noted,
however, that the decisions indicate that the courts have been unwilling to allow recovery for the tort action except in the cases
where the omission has been malicious, unreasonable, or inhuman.
In these cases the omission actually aggravates the victim's injuries.
Finally, since the omission makes up but a part of the injury, liability is imposed only to that limited extent, as evidenced by the
scant six hundred dollar judgment against the five defendants in
76
the Colin case.
CRITICISM

Article 63, and its facsimiles, is susceptible to criticism in
Anglo-American courts. Rather than being constructive, the criticism has generally been destructive and illogical, ignored and rebutted. The rebuttals, however, have been as a vox clamantis in
deserto."

The obvious criticism is that such a statute is practically impossible to enforce because of the difficulty in identifying and
apprehending one who refuses to get involved. It is submitted that
this is a problem inherent in enforcing all-criminal laws, yet these
laws continue to be promulgated and enforced in a significantly
73. Colin et autres, supra note 56, at 31.
74. Tribunal Correctionnel d'Aix, March 27, 1947, (1947) D. 304 (1947)
J.C.P. II. 3583.
75. Dawson, op. cit. supra note 40, at 1107-08. Dawson, in his article,
was mainly interested in showing the possible application of the Roman
Law concept of negotiorum gestio to rescue situations whereby the successful rescuer would be entitled to compensation for his services. See BUcKLAND, A TExTBooK OF ROMAN LAW 537-538 (2d ed. 1932), for an explanation
of the Roman doctrine.
76. Colin et autres, supra note 56.
77. See authorities cited notes 3 and 25 supra.
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large percentage of cases. Furthermore, the objection is ill-founded
in view of the fact that persons are apprehended and prosecuted in
the countries where such a law exists.
Would the adoption of a statute similar to Article 63 result in
a flood of false prosecutions? Again, the criminal law has had to
deal with this problem from its inception. Every defendant has the
right to offer proof of his innocence by way of defense, as well as
the right to sue in his own turn for malicious prosecution, which
remedy serves as an ample deterrent to false prosecution. On the
other hand, it is argued that the fear of prosecution for failing to
rescue in the appropriate situation would encourage officious intermeddling in the affairs of others. 8 The problem appears to be in
determining whether or not assistance is required. The fear is
baseless since the statute and the courts are explicit in delineating
the conditions which require intervention and the type to be employed, and it is common knowledge that the public prefers noninvolvement in rescue situations. The rule imposing a duty to rescue is aimed at overcoming this selfish conduct while alleviating
unnecessary suffering and death where it is indirectly proportionate
to the risk to the rescuer.
Another objection to the rule is that it curtails the personal
freedom of the individual so revered by Anglo-Americans. The
argument goes further in maintaining that such a rule makes a
man the slave of another which is one of the indicia heralding the
approach of the abhorred socialistic state. The purpose of the
criminal law is to deter the commission of immoral acts against the
members of society, the argument continues, not to require that
certain acts be performed. It is submitted that when the sense of
public moral responsibility is feeble, it must be strengthened by a
law which reflects and sanctions moral conduct. 79 It is clear that
the prevention of crime is imperative, but it is not enough to merely
prevent crime; it must be abated as well. Thus, a rule imposing a
duty to rescue is not inconsistent but consonant with the humanitarian ideals and principles of a democratic society and the purposes
of its criminal law.
The mass rescue problem is criticised as a situation which reduces a duty to rescue statute to an absurdity. The argument is
that the legal duty cannot be impressed upon every person in a
crowd since this would mean that the whole group would have to
effect the rescue. A mass rescue would be a failure, according to
.78. See Hitchler, The Physical Element of Crime, 39 DicK L. REV. 95,
109 (1934).
79. Goldberg, Misprision of Felony: An Old Concept in a New Context,

52 A.B.A.J. 148 (1966).
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the proponents of this view, whereas one person from the crowd
could fulfill the letter of the law and lift the liability for inaction
from the others. This view is unrealistic. The division of labor is
a basic principle utilized by great nations. If the defendants in
the Colin case had divided the duty to rescue among themselves,
Fleury would probably be alive today. While Mariotte went for
the doctor, one of the other boys could have bound his wounds
while others could have been calling an ambulance and the police.
A division of labor is very helpful in an emergency situation.
Contrary to the theory of the critics, Mariotte did not relieve the
members of the group from liability. 0
If it were possible for the defendant to circumvent liability by
simply showing that he did not believe the victim to be in any
serious danger when he saw him, or that he did not appreciate the
gravity of his plight, it is probable that it would be difficult for
the courts to put the lid back on Pandora's box. The French
courts have adopted the test of reasonableness under the circumstances in these cases.81 It is proposed that the Anglo-American
courts would readily adopt this test under the same circumstances.
The reasonable man is not a stranger in the common law courts.
The judge would charge the jury in such a case that the defendant is liable if a "reasonable man under the same circumstances"
would have realized the danger to the victim.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

TO THE PROBLEM:

THE

REScUE OF THE

GOOD SAMARITAN

Although the morality of the good Samaritan is universally
recognized, the foregoing analysis has pointed out that it is not
universally enforced nor practiced in the modern social context.
Realizing the impassivity and reluctance of people to help
others in trouble, the objectives of the French experience have been
to promote public morality and safety through law. Article 63 and
the many similar laws in other countries8 2 encourage benevolent
conduct toward others by attaching criminal liability to voluntary
abstention from such conduct. Since the objectives of the criminal
and tort law are consistent with each other, the standard of conduct required by Article 63 was quite naturally used to define the
tort and permit the recovery of damages from the wrongful abstainer.
80. For a further discussion of this objection and others see Note, 52
COLUM. L. REv. 631 (1952).
81. Tribunal Correctional de Colmar, May 12, 1960 (1960) Gazette du
Palais II. 112 (Fr.).
82. See note 1 supra.
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Great spokesmen of the Anglo-American common law system
83
have decried the moral debilitation of the citizenry for decades,
but thus far the appeals have gone unheeded. Rescue under the
common law means possible liability, whereas abstention assures
immunity. The benevolent Samaritan must be rescued from this
system.
The shortcomings of the Anglo-American rescue laws necessitate self-reliance in dangerous situations. The common law of rescue offers no assistance at all to persons like Mrs. Zelenko and
Blanche Burns, who were unable to help themselves. It merely
provides possible liability for those who would help. Such a law
will be of little comfort to us when we find ourselves in a helpless
situation.
George Goldberg of the New York Bar, recently noted that
"the greatness of Anglo-American common law is its versatility.
A newly recognized societal need will almost invariably find its
answer within the traditional bounds of the system. '8 4 The fact
that many state legislatures are passing so-called good Samaritan
laws, 5 considerably reducing the liability of doctors who render
emergency aid at the scene of an accident, is an excellent barometer
indicating that even the men who have sworn to uphold the tenets
of the Hippocratic oath do not always render aid to injured strangers. Legislation similar to Article 63 should be introduced into
the Anglo-American system, not to compel people to help others,
but to provide them with lifesaving assistance when they find
themselves in a helpless or unconscious state.
It is said that the sudden imposition of criminal liability for
failure to rescue would be too great a shock to the citizens under
the aegis of the common law system.88 If it is shock treatment
that is required to change public apathy, then it should be administered. 87 In 1908 Dean Ames of the Harvard Law School
83. See note 25 supra. "There is no legal duty to be a good Samaritan.
Such a rule represents an attitude of rugged, perhaps heartless individualism ...." 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS 1045 (1956).
84. Goldberg, supra note 79.
85. See, eg., PA. STAT. ANN.tit. 12, §§ 1641-42 (Supp. 1965).
86. Approximately thirty states have enacted Good Samaritan Laws.
See 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (1964). In McClure v. U.S. Lines, 247 F. Supp.
272 (E.D. Va. 1964), the widow of seaman McClure invoked Article 63 of
the French Penal Code as a basis for recovery of damages for the death
of her husband in France. The court held that Article 63 imposed liability
upon one who refuses aid and not upon one who aids ineffectively.
87. See Connelly v. Kaufman, 349 Pa. 261, 37 A.2d 125 (1944), wherein
it is stated that "the history of the development of the law reveals that
practically all our law of torts (as well as crimes) is based on moral obligations ....

A principle of social conduct may be recognized so univer-

sally as to demand that it be observed as a legal duty."
A.2d at 129.

Id. at 270-71, 37
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proposed:
One who fails to interfere to save another from impending
death or great bodily harm, when he might do so with little
or no inconvenience to himself, and the death or great
bodily harm follows as a consequence of his inaction, shall
be punished criminally and shall make compensation to
the party injured or to his widow and children in the case
of death.88
Ames' statute provides the putative rescuer with the choice
to intervene or not according to the circumstances of the risk to
the rescuer. However, there are statutes in forty-six states which
89
require a citizen to assist a police officer in carrying out his duties.
Under these statutes the citizen must assist or suffer the penalties
of the law. The Pennsylvania statute reads:
[W]hoever being required by any officer, neglects to assist him in the execution of his office in any criminal case,
or in the preservation of the peace, or in apprehending
for a breach of the peace, is guilty
and securing any person
of a misdemeanor.9 0
The penalty for noncompliance is a fine up to $500.00 and/or one
year imprisonment. These statutes go well beyond Article 63.
Under Article 63, the citizen decides whether the situation requires
his intervention and what form his assistance should take. If he is
later subject to suit, he has available a defense for his action.
Under the police statutes however, the policeman has absolute discretion in deciding when the duty to assist shall arise; failure to
comply is a crime. Furthermore, under the police statute, the
citizen must assist without regard to the risk involved; the situation in which a police officer demands assistance is likely to involve danger. Personal risk under a similar situation is a valid
excuse from direct intervention under Article 63.
The duty to rescue is also imposed upon the masters of ships
at sea. Masters are required to "render assistance to every person
The penalties for
who is found at sea in danger of being lost."9t
the failure to perform this duty are fine and imprisonment.
It is submitted that it is shocking that the imposition of criminal liability for the failure to rescue applies only to a selected few
in our society, not to everyone. It should be enforced universally.
88. Ames, Law and Morals at 113; THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW
241, 279 (Ratcliff ed. 1966). See also Notes, 17 CORNELL L. Q. 505, 509
(1931-32), 44 NEB.L. REv. 499 (1965).
89. See Comment 14 DE PAUL L. REV. 159 (1964). E.g., CALIF. PEN.

§ 31-8 (1963); N.Y.PEN. LAW
§§ 1848, 2095. Cf. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws § 195.10 (McKinney 1965) (effecCODE §§ 150, 723 (1955); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,

tive Sept. 1, 1967) (failure or refusal to aid a peace officer must be unreasonable to be punishable).
90.

91.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,

§ 4727

(1963).

46 U.S.C. § 728 (1964); 37 Stat. 1658, 1672 (1913).
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In 1965 the California Legislature passed a law to encourage
civilian assistance in the prevention of crime. Under this statute,
the good Samaritan is indemnified by the state for any corporeal
92 or property damage suffered while helping to prevent a crime.
The law is commendable, but it should embrace civil rescue cases
as well. The California Legislature has proposed another law
which, if passed, would eliminate liability completely in any emergency rescue situation. 93 The proposed bill is overwhelming in
that it would immunize even gross negligence on the part of a
rescuer.
The progressive California legislation is indicative of the desire of common law jurisdictions to encourage samaritanism among
the citizenry; but it does not make samaritanism a duty.
In the alternative, the development of exceptions to the common law rule that there is no duty to rescue should be carried to its
logical conclusion. It is submitted that the special relationships,
such as passenger-carrier and invitor-invitee, which create civil
liability, should utilmately be expanded to include the "rescuerrescuee" relationship. The duty to rescue would arise when the
danger to the victim is realized by the potential rescuer. When this
duty is breached, there is a cause of action for damages for a negligent omission.
The "rescuer-rescuee" relationship should be given legal sanction and recognition, not as a panecea for the ills of society, but as
a means of mitigating human suffering and deterring criminal
violence.
It may not be long before some pioneering court will take
the further step urged by Ames some 50 years ago....
The real basis of objection to liability is that the law should
not try to force unselfishness or make one man serve his
fellows. In a society whose values are still significantly
individualistic, this objection deserves great weight. But,
we submit, those values would be properly safeguarded
under Ames' rule by its careful limitations and 94its coincidence with the universal judgment of our society.
ROBERT A. CARLSON
92. CALIF. PEN. CODE § 13600 (Supp. 1965); See Time, May 13, 1966,
p. 84 (a man was compensated for injuries suffered while preventing a
burglary). See N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAws ch. 894, § 624 (McKinney Supp. Aug.
1966) (effective March 1, 1967) (providing compensation for victims of
crime and those injured in aiding in the prevention of crimes). See also
N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1966, p. 26, col. 1. (Annual pension of $4,420 granted
under N.Y. City "Good Samaritan Law" to widow of a rescuer killed while
two women being molested by a hoodlum.)
93. Assembly Bill No. 2090, March 29, 1965. Referred to the committee
on Judiciary. The bill is due for consideration at 1967 Legislative Sessions.
94. 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.6 at 1046 (1956).

